How Do You Cross-Examine an Ostrich?

Readers might have noticed that we like commenting on posts in the Wall Street Journal Law Blog. We don’t cover “Big Law” or “Big Business” nor do we usually comment on criminal law, all LB specialties, but some LB posts just stimulate thought and, in this case, memories.

So it is with the recent post by Dan Slater on how Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, allowed the “Ostrich Instruction” in a criminal jury trial (“Conrad Black’s Sentence Upheld; 7th Circuit OKs Ostrich Instruction”). We’ll pass on commenting on the criminal matter under discussion in the post.

Instead, the concept of an “Ostrich Instruction” reminded me of our firm’s experience with a civil matter, specifically an adverse possession matter that also involved a jury trial. I believe that without being aware at the time, we were confronted with a similar concept which, with apologies to Judge Posner, we will call the “Ostrich Defense.”

An earlier post on this blog generally described the concept of adverse possession ("Losing Your Property Rights Through Inattention". For the sake of brevity, we will now simply say it is a claim that you own part or all of your neighbor’s property after a prescribed period of claimed continuous possession; there is more to it, of course, and for the rest I refer you to the earlier post.

The “Ostrich Instruction,” in a criminal context, is explained by LB in its post with a quote from Judge Posner, who coined the term, as follows:

An “ostrich instruction,” Posner explains, “tells the jury that to suspect that you are committing a crime and then take steps to avoid confirming the suspicion is the equivalent of intending to commit the crime.” Posner also clears up a fallacy: The legend that ostriches bury their head in the sand when frightened, he says, is “pure legend and a canard on a very distinguished bird.”).

The situation involving our derivative “Ostrich Defense” was as follows: In New York, for adverse possession, it is a settled principle that when claiming ownership of a neighbor’s property, the claimant’s knowledge of the actual boundary lines is not all that relevant. However, acknowledgment of the boundary lines would soundly defeat the claim. 

In our adverse possession case, the claimant maintained he could not possibly have acknowledged the boundary lines because he never had knowledge of the boundary lines. This, despite signing numerous documents submitted to municipal authorities that did acknowledge the boundary lines. He claimed to have signed the documents in blank so he never could have had the requisite knowledge

There was, of course, cross-examination (by our firm’s other partner Beverley Rogers) and the jury found for our client, the property owner. On appeal, the claimant dropped the adverse possession claim and tried only for a prescriptive easement, where you have right to use but do not own the property. That failed too, the appellate case is 40 AD3d 577, 834 N.Y.S.2d 330 (2d Dep’t 2007).

Well, how do you cross-examine a witness who is relying on the “Ostrich Defense?” Persistently. In this particular case, it was a matter of allowing the claimant to bring out his own inconsistencies.

On the other hand, could the “Ostrich Defense” actually be effective? I have to concede it could be a legitimate and effective defense in a civil matter under the right circumstances.

But, that would be a different case and a different post.

The Right to Refuse to Settle

The Delaware Business Litigation Report recently reported a case in which the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the right to refuse to settle “Court of Chancery Upholds Right To Refuse To Settle”). One might wonder why that right was ever in question.

The case was somewhat complex and involved an insurer, a company, the company’s former directors and D&O coverage. The company wanted the former directors to settle so it could use their admission of liability, part of the settlement, as a legal “club” against the insurer. 

The Court did not think much of the company’s argument against its directors and upheld the directors’ right to refuse to settle. But,  the company’s position was at least based on a thought-out, rational legal strategy. I won’t actually comment further about that particular case, the text of which is available on the DBLR post.

I will comment on situations, encountered often, in which clients refuse to settle not because of any legal strategy, good or bad, but because of strictly emotional reasons. These situations are unfortunate.

Settlement puts the parties in charge. They can decide the terms by which their dispute be resolved. In a fully litigated case, the court decides for the parties. Often, unlike the Delaware case, there is no insurance involved and the parties exhaust themselves financially.

In our firm, we make it a practice to counsel litigation clients to start thinking about the acceptable terms of a settlement at the outset of a case. Of course, not every case can settle or, even when it can, not necessarily early on. Sometimes the parties need to go through discovery and pre-trial procedures to fully understand their positions. Sometimes, as was once pointed out to me by a judge’s clerk, the parties need to start spend money to fully realize the wisdom of a settlement. 

Most cases do settle. One of the challenges of litigation, however, is to bring around that client who for purely emotional, sometimes seemi

What Do You Win When You Win At Trial?

Many people remember the long-running Broadway (and national) show, Les Miserables, or, at least, its music. Some may also remember that it was based on Victor Hugo’s 19th century novel Les Miserables and that both the old TV program and the movie, The Fugitive, loosely reflect the same novel in story and concept. The character, Inspector Javert, the detective who doggedly pursues the main character, Jean Valjean, for years, may be less-well remembered.

I was reminded by a recent court decision that many prospective plaintiffs need to contemplate whether they will have to become Javerts themselves in order to gain any benefits from their litigation. 

Thus was I thinking when I read the decision reported recently in the private blog of the Real Property Law Section of the New York State Bar Association. A New York County Appellate Division decision (for out-of-staters: first level of appeal after a trial in the court of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court), held that a renewal judgment is entered as of the date it was granted, and the liens of mortgages (recorded prior to that date) receive priority over that judgment. Gletzer v. Harris, 2008 WL 678589 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co.). The controversy arose when a judgment creditor applied for renewal of a judgment lien for a second ten-year run and was ultimately granted the renewal but nunc pro tunc (retroactively) to a date four years earlier.

The decision is somewhat technical and its impact may not be appreciated without a great deal of background. However, the decision affords the opportunity to fill-in some of that background by reviewing fundamentals that should be reviewed with a client before commencing a lawsuit. One can start with a very fundamental question: what do you win when you win at trial?

In most cases, you win a judgment. If it is a money judgment, you hope that the defendant will simply pay it. And, many do pay, which in that case ends the discussion. If the defendant doesn’t pay it, what have you won? 

 

A few more fundamentals:

In New York:

1. A judgment is good for 20 years but it is lien against real property for only 10 years. 

2. The lien can be renewed for another 10. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §5014.

3. During those 10 (or 20) years, the plaintiff has won the right to attempt to enforce it, using a variety of devices and proceedings.

4. During those 10 (or 20) years, the judgment lien encumbers real estate owned by the judgment debtor in the county where the judgment was recorded. It will be very difficult to sell real estate in that county without paying off the judgment.

5. The judgment (or technically a transcript of it) can be recorded in any number of counties; thus, if you win in one county, you can take it to a county where the defendant owns property.

6. During those 10 (or 20) years, the judgment accrues interest at the statutory rate of 9 percent. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§5003, 5004

7. As a lien, a judgment is subject to the rules of priority among liens, along with mortgages, support liens, mechanics liens and other varieties. Hence, a controversy arose in the case discussed above over whether a late-granted renewal lost its priority when two mortgages were recorded in the meantime. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §5203(a).      

From the above, we can discern both good news and bad news for the plaintiff or would-be plaintiff. 

The good: a judgment lasts a long time, accrues interest (in New York) at 9 percent and can be enforced by a variety of legal means.

The bad: it can take 10, 20 years (even after years of litigation) to obtain payment, it is subject to a prescribed pattern of priority among other liens (meaning other creditors may get paid first), the legal enforcement devices add the expenses of collection to the expenses of the original litigation and, if the defendant honestly, truly has no assets (or is truly good at hiding them) may never be paid.

Thus, another fundamental principle: before litigation is commenced, there should be a careful discussion with the would-be plaintiff about expectations. Sometimes the results of litigation are fairly immediate. Sometimes, the results of litigation are not immediate or self-implementing and after spending money for many years, the prevailing plaintiff has only won the right to spend more money to try to enforce a judgment by chasing the defendant for still many more years, somewhat like Javert. 

Note: Javert was obsessive and in the end was faced with moral ambiguity that his rigid personality could not handle because Valjean’s original crime was petty and while a fugitive he lived an exemplary life. So, although the analogy in many respects does not quite work, we use it anyway to make a narrow point for which it does work: “the chase” can be maddening. Ultimately, Javert jumped into the Seine.

Another Case of Turning the Tables on a Sub-prime Lender?

Only a few days ago we thought we were being lawyerly and careful in observing that it’s not often that the tables will be turned on a foreclosing lender as they were in the LaSalle case on which we were commenting at the time. The Law Blog of the Wall Street Journal recently reported another lender had been “dinged” (LB’s term) in court. The LB post provides a link to the Wall Street Journal news story.

The situation, in this case, involved some letters that were possibly forged and used as a basis to threaten foreclosure. The lender’s explanation, as reported in the WSJ news story was that the letters were re-created electronically by an employee.

The WSJ also reports that an executive of Countrywide Financial, the lender, testifying before Congress, admitted that sometimes employees made mistakes but denied that the lender intentionally abused its homeowners. 

I would give Countrywide the benefit of the doubt. Mistakes are probably more common than outright, systematic abuse. But, in our post we were making a limited point: that the borrower/homeowner, threatened or in the midst of foreclosure, should consult an attorney and explore all options. That is just as true when dealing with “employees’ mistakes” as it is in the case of intentional wrong-doing.  

Brown Bag Lunch & Employment Law at Ridgefield Chamber of Commerce

Partner Beverley Rogers led a lively discussion of Employment Law, primarily hiring practices, at the “Brown Bag Lunch” sponsored by the Ridgefield, CT Chamber of Commerce on Thursday, February 21. Our other partner, Angelo Tartaro, also attended and provided light assistance. The questions raised by attendees highlight issues of concern to the Ridgefield business organizations.

Our goal is to keep our clients and readers out of litigation, if possible. With that in mind, in leading the discussion Beverley did not dwell on technical distinctions and defenses such as the varying definitions of “employer” and “employee” under federal and state statutes and caselaw. Rather, the focus, as in this Blog, was on “best or at least better” practices of good management to avoid tangles of a legal dispute over hiring and other employment practices.

With that in mind, Beverley presented and discussed a series of questions that may and may not be asked at an employment interview. For example, an interviewer is asking for trouble when questions involve childcare arrangements but not whether a frequent travel schedule will be acceptable to the applicant. An interviewer should never ask whether an applicant has ever been arrested but it is perfectly acceptable to ask whether the applicant was ever convicted of a crime. Questions relating to sexual preference, religious practices, national origin (such as the derivation of your last name) have not place. Questions relating to whether the applicant can perform the essential functions of the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation, are acceptable. Of course, the interviewer should not suggest that a reasonable accommodation might be necessary; the applicant must request it. The examples discussed are too numerous to review here in detail; to download her handout, click here.

The attendees were very interested in how to handle a situation where the applicant volunteers information about a “forbidden subject.” The interviewer should state that the information is not appropriate to discuss any further and return the discussion to the essential functions of the position. And, the interviewer’s notes should not reflect any information about the inappropriate subject matter.

Beverley advised that notes of the interview should be kept separate from the job application. An attendee volunteered a humorous anecdote that reinforced the point. It seems the organization’s Human Resources auditors wanted to know why a notation of “W” was made an a job application. The implication was that the notation meant “White” or “Woman.” In fact, it denoted the “Western” division of the hiring organization. The better practice is not to have any notations that could be misinterpreted for a discriminatory purpose. Beverley presented and discussed a sample employment application from ____________________, which can be downloaded by clicking here.

Moving on from employment to other practices, Beverley explained that Connecticut and New York are still “employment at will” states in which an employee can be terminated for any reason but that protected classes of employees cannot be terminated for a discriminatory reason or under other circumstances covered by specific statutes or for specific conduct that is actionable under federal or state common law. An example of the latter was illustrated by one of our firm’s recent cases in which a client received a favorable settlement after suing an employer for defamation because he was wrongfully accused of stealing without an investigation.

In that case, an investigation was promised by the Employee Manual but the management largely ignored its manual. Attendees were very interested in Employee Manuals and the nuances of what they should or should not include as policies. That discussion was too extensive for this article but two general points stand out: (1) the better practice is to issue a manual and obtained a signed receipt when first issued and when updated; and (2) the manual does not do much good if actual practices deviate from those promised in the manual.

We may not be the most objective observers but we came away with the impression that the attendees found the event to be enjoyable, informative and topical.